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RESTATING THE "RELIANCE INTEREST"
Robert E. Hudect
INTRODUCTION
No scholarly work during the period between the first and second
Restatement of Contracts had more impact on the law of contracts than
Fuller and Perdue's 1936 article The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages. I
The article conceptualized contract remedies in terms of three "inter-
ests" that a promisee may be said to have: expectation, reliance, and
restitution.2 The main purpose of this interest matrix was to argue for
acceptance of the reliance interest as a distinct basis of remedy. Fuller
and Perdue documented the existing judicial practice of awarding reli-
ance damages and other less-than-expectancy remedies in cases where
the award of full expectancy damages is found to be inappropriate.
t Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Visiting Professor of Law (1981-82), Cor-
nell Law School. B.A. 1956, Kenyon College; M.A. 1958, Cambridge University; LL.B. 1961,
Yale University; LL.D. 1979, Kenyon College.
1 Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YAL LJ. 52,
373 (1936).
2 Fuller and Perdue defined the three interests as follows:
It is convenient to distinguish three principal purposes which may be
pursued in awarding contract damages. These purposes, and the situations in
which they become appropriate, may be stated briefly as follows:
First, the plaintiff has in reliance on the promise of the defendant con-
ferred some value on the defendant. The defendant fails to perform his prom-
ise. The court may force the defendant to disgorge the value he received from
the plaintiff. The object here may be termed the prevention of gain by the
defaulting promisor at the expense of the promisee; more briefly, the preven-
tion of unjust enrichment. The interest protected may be called the restitution
interest ...
Secondly, the plaintiff has in reliance on the promise of the defendant
changed his position. For example, the buyer under a contract for the sale of
land has incurred expense in the investigation of the seller's title, or has ne-
glected the opportunity to enter other contracts. We may award damages to
the plaintiff for the purpose of undoing the harm which his reliance on the
defendant's promise has caused him. Our object is to put him in as good a
position as he was in before the promise was made. The interest protected in
this case may be called the reliance interest.
Thirdy, without insisting on reliance by the promisee or enrichment of the
promisor, we may seek to give the promisee the value of the expectancy which
the promise created. We may in a suit for specific performance actually com-
pel the defendant to render the promised performance to the plaintiff, or, in a
suit for damages, we may make the defendant pay the money value of this
performance. Here our object is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he
would have occupied had the defendant performed his promise. The interest
protected in this case we may call the expectation interest.
Id at 53-54.
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They offered their interest analysis as a theoretical and policy justifica-
tion for providing such remedies openly and explicitly. The interest
analysis has since become standard fare in law school classrooms and in
legal writing about contract remedies. Although explicit judicial recog-
nition has been less widespread, the few decisions that have employed
the analysis enjoy a "leading case" prominence that give it the feel of
established doctrine.3
3 Consider, for instance, the treatment of Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296
N.E.2d 183 (1973) in R. DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CorRAcr L\v 5-43 (1978).
Sullivan contains perhaps the most extensivc explicit application of the interest analysis, sug-
gesting in dictum that the reliance measure would be the most appropriate remedy for breach
of a doctor's promise guaranteeing results of treatment. Other decisions that have received
similar attention include L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182, 189 (2d
Cir. 1949) (discussed in notes 61-66 and accompanying text infra); Albre Marble & Tile Co. v.
John Bowen Co., 338 Mass. 394, 399, 155 N.E.2d 437, 440 (1959) (discussed in note 33 ira);
Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. 1965) (recovery of reliance damages for breach of
promise to lend money).
Computer research turned up 25 majority opinions and 4 dissents in which the Reliance
Interest article was cited. In addition to the opinions cited above, the following opinions indi-
cate approval ofsome part of the article's substantive analysis: Glasscock v. Wilson Construc-
tors, Inc., 627 F.2d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir. 1980) (reliance damages recoverable in lieu of
expectancy damages; without citation to article, court also applies "promissory estoppel" to
enforce an oral promise within Statute of Frauds); Hector Martinez & Co. v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 606 F.2d 106, 108 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979) (recites interest analysis; reliance damages
recoverable where expectancy incalculable); Coastal Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Algernon Blair,
Inc., 479 F.2d 638, 640 n.l, 641 & n.7 (4th Cir. 1973) (restitution interest most compelling
claim to recovery; contract price not a ceiling on restitution claim); Kizas v. Webster, 532 F.
Supp. 1331, 1332 (D.D.C. 1982)(article cited in support of reliance damage measure of recov-
ery where value of expectancy cannot be proved); Pineman v. Oechslin, 494 F. Supp. 525, 540
(D. Conn. 1980) (article cited for promissory estoppel; court also uses "reliance interest" ter-
minology without citation, in finding that state pension plan creates contractual obligations);
In re Yeager Co., 227 F. Supp. 92, 96, 98 (N.D. Ohio 1963) (extensive dictum restating inter-
est analysis; reliance damages recoverable in lieu of expectancy damages); Johnson v. Healy,
176 Conn. 97, 106, 405 A.2d 54, 59 (1978) (reliance damages recoverable where expectancy
not accessible to proof; Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So. 2d 444, 447 (La. 1974) (when con-
tract fails for illegality, reliance damages not exceeding benefit received, recoverable under
culpa in contrahendo rationale); Center Garment Co. v. United Refr. Co., 369 Mass. 633, 639,
341 N.E.2d 669, 674 (1976) (reliance losses recoverable in lieu of lost profits); Freund v. Wash-
ington Square Press, 34 N.Y.2d 379, 383, 314 N.E.2d 419, 421, 357 N.Y.S.2d 857, 860 (1974)
(defines three interests; finds plaintiff's damage claims would overcompensate all three); West,
Weir & Bartel, Inc. v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 25 A.D.2d 81, 88, 267 N.Y.S.2d 29, 36 (1966)
(contract price is ceiling for reliance expenses); Osborn v. Commanche Cattle Indus., 545
P.2d 827, 831-32 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) (questionable holding that reliance damages available
for breach of 30-day notice requirement for franchise termination, in addition to lost profits
for 30 days).
Two dissents that incorporate a particularly important part of the article's analysis are
found in: Garcia v. Von Miesky, 602 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J., dissenting) (sur-
geon's warranty of sterility justifies pregnant woman's recovery for out-of-pocket costs); Cole-
man Eng'g Co. v. North Am. Aviation, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 396, 420 & n.8, 420 P.2d 713, 719 &
n.8, 55 Cal. Rptr. 1, 17 & n.8 (1966) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (reliance damages appropriate
where contract fails due to indefiniteness).
The article is cited in one United States Supreme Court decision. In Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979), Justice Brennan, in response to a claim that federal statutes prohibit-
ing commerce in eagle feathers were an unconstitutional taking, cited Fuller and Perdue for
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Quite naturally, Fuller and Perdue's analysis has influenced the
Restatement (Second) of Contract's treatment of contract remedies. Its
most significant impact is found in a number of black-letter rules au-
thorizing the award of less-than-expectancy remedies, either as an alter-
native to recovery of the full expectancy or as a limited remedy where
no liability for expectancy damages is recognized. The Restatement Second
authorizes such remedies for certain promises that lack consideration
(sections 86, 87, 89, 90), certain oral promises barred by the Statute of
Frauds (section 139), and certain promises held enforceable despite a
defense of mental incapacity (section 15). The Restatement Second also
provides for less-than-expectancy remedies in some cases where promises
have been excused under doctrines of mistake, frustration or impractica-
bility (sections 158, 272). Finally, it provides that courts may award
reliance damages when the value of the expectancy cannot be proved
(section 349), and that courts may limit consequential damages when
full compensation of the expectancy is deemed excessive (section 351(3)).
In addition to these operative rules, the Restatement Second's "Remedies"
Chapter opens with a separate section declaring the existence of the
three interests and defining them (section 344).
Most of the operative rules authorizing partial recovery contain no
reference to the interest analysis stated in section 344. Only two of the
rules use the term reliance interest as an operative concept: section 349,
which authorizes the award of reliance damages when the expectancy
cannot be proved, and sections 158 and 272, which authorize relief in
cases where contracts are discharged for reasons of mistake, impractica-
bility or frustration. All the other rules give the courts authority to limit
damages "as justice requires," either with no mention of reliance dam-
ages at all, or in one case, with reliance damages merely being men-
tioned as one possible measure of the recovery that justice may require. 4
This Article examines that part of the Restatement Second which em-
ploys Fuller and Perdue's reliance interest concept directly. It deals pri-
marily with section 344, which restates the interest matrix, and sections
158, 272 and 349, which use the concept as an operative term. Part I of
this Article examines the theoretical significance of the Restatement Sec-
ond's explicit recognition of the reliance interest. Part II examines the
scope of the special damage remedy in section 349 for "damages based
on [the promisee's] reliance interest."
the proposition that "the interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less
compelling than other property-related interests." For an opinion incorporating the same
analysis of the expectation interest, see Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111,
127 (2d Cir. 1976) (VanGraafeiland, J., dissenting) (expectancy damages excessive for tenu-
ous type of "contract" at issue).
4 Sometimes the power to limit damages is stated explicitly, as in §§ 90 & 139; in other
cases, it is made applicable by making the underlying promise binding only to a limited




RECOGNITION OF THE RELIANCE INTEREST
A. The Message and its Overtones
Fuller and Perdue's interest matrix appears in section 344. It reads:
PURPOSES OF REMEDIES
Judicial remedies under the rules in this Restatement serve to protect
one or more of the following interests of a promisee:
(a) his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having
the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract been performed,
(b) his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reim-
bursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as
good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been
made, or
(c) his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having re-
stored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.
5
Section 344 is a most curious black-letter proposition. It states no
rule. The title suggests that section 344 may be a statement of purpose
that will govern the answers to later operational issues, but such a role
never materializes.6 Nor do the definitions of the three interests play a
significant role in the subsequent operative rules that define how the
three remedies are to be measured. The expectation and restitution def-
initions are overtaken by more specific measuring standards stated in
the subsequent operating rules. 7 The reliance definition does play a lim-
ited role later on, but hardly one that justifies a separate definitional
section.8 The absence of a functional purpose suggests that section 344
is meant simply to declare the separate existence of the three interests.
The purpose of the section 344 declaration must be sought in the
origins of the interest matrix. Fuller and Perdue's use of the matrix was
intended primarily to call attention to reliance losses as a particularly
compelling object of remedial justice, and to argue that questions of lia-
bility for such losses ought to be considered separately from the liability
rules for other kinds of loss caused by promise-breaking. Their assertion
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1979).
6 The black-letter rule of § 344 makes only the more limited statement that contract
remedies "serve to protect" these three interests. The idea of a governing purpose is further
submerged in Comment a to § 344, where the reader is warned: "The interests described in
this Section are not inflexible limits on relief and in situations in which a court grants such
relief as justice requires, the relief may not correspond precisely to any of these interests. See
§§ 15, 87, 89, 90, 139, 158 and 272." Id, Comment a (1979).
7 Although the terms "expectation interest" and "restitution interest" are both used in
the black-letter rules defining their respective measures of recovery, both terms are effectively
supplanted by more precise "as measured by" definitions. See id §§ 347 & 371.
8 For discussion of the reliance interest as a measuring standard in § 349, see notes 34-
70 and accompanying text infia.
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that a separate "reliance interest" exists was not meant to dictate any
particular legal consequences. Rather, it was in part descriptive of cer-
tain already recognized remedies for reliance losses, such as promissory
estoppel, and in part an open-ended invitation to consider all other mat-
ters involving reliance losses as distinct questions of policy that need not
be controlled by the answers given for contract damages generally.
The substantive message of the reliance interest concept has often
been clouded by theoretical concerns about the character and founda-
tion of the separate rules of liability being advocated. The Fuller and
Perdue article itself had to engage somewhat reluctantly in a certain
amount of such conceptual argumentation to defend its position. The
first Restatement had contained an elaborate analysis and justification of
reliance damages, arguing that they involved no new principle of con-
tract damages, but were merely an application of the conventional rem-
edy of expectation damages without the element of profit.9 Fuller and
Perdue labeled the explanation "tendentious."' 10 They were arguing that
limits on the award of expectancy damages should not necessarily en-
cumber the decision to grant reliance damages." For example, they
thought that courts should be able to award reliance damages for
breach of an oral promise barred by the Statute of Frauds, without run-
ning afoul of the contention that such damages were a form of "contract
damages," and thus a form of "contract enforcement" contrary to the
policy of the Statute.1 2 The "tendentious" insistence that reliance dam-
ages were merely a subspecies of expectation damages obviously made
arguing against such conceptual limitations more difficult.
The remedy of restitution had not been limited by such thinking,
for it was possible to argue that restitution involved a different kind of
wrong (unjust enrichment) and was thus a separate cause of action dis-
tinct from contract damages. Fuller and Perdue disliked such a justifi-
cation, frequently deriding the conceptualism involved in classifying
remedies as the "same" or "separate."1 3 They preferred to rest their
argument on the more down-to-earth analysis of the varying degrees of
ethical urgency involved in the package of harms usually covered by the
expectation interest. Nonetheless, as their "tendentious" comment
shows, Fuller and Perdue were prepared to insulate their argument
against such "same-separate" objections by carving out some degree of
"separateness" for reliance damages as well.
The identification of a separate reliance interest, parallel to and of
equal rank with interests of expectancy and restitution served to ad-
9 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 333, Comment a (1932).
10 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 90.
11 Id at 89-90, 95, 401-06, 418-20.
12 Id at 386-94.
13 See, e.g., id at 387-88.
[Vol. 67:704
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vance this idea of separateness. Although it was primarily an analytical
tool to explain the policy Fuller and Perdue were advocating, their in-
terest matrix also implied that reliance is just as separate from contract
damages as is restitution. Fuller and Perdue were not above showing
how the interest matrix could be used in this manner if necessary. Con-
sider, for example, their argument that reimbursement of reliance under
an oral contract within the Statute of Frauds should not be considered
offensive to the Statute's policy against "enforcement" of such oral
contracts:
There is, then, no distinction which requires a court to deny re-
imbursement for reliance, and, at the same time, permits it to grant
restitution on a contract made unenforceable by the statute. A court
which broadened its intervention to include a protection of the reli-
ance interest might justify its stand on the ground that the admitted
differences between the restitution and reliance interests are insuffi-
cient to warrant a difference in legal treatment, and might properly
view the reimbursement of reliance, not as involving legal sanction for
the unenforceable agreement, but as having the same raison d'etre as
restitution-that of remedying injustices left when the statute denies
enforcement to the oral contract.
14
Comments such as this reinforce a tendency to view reliance as in-
volving a type of wrong wholly separate from promise-breaking, in the
way that unjust enrichment is separate. Such a view, of course, leads to
the classic losing-contract question: Whether reliance damages, like res-
titution, may exceed the amount that would have been recovered if the
promised performance had been rendered (the so-called expectancy ceil-
ing). Fuller and Perdue considered the question and rejected this line of
reasoning. Their analysis implicitly treated reliance damages as a form
of liability that, like ordinary contract damages, rested on the promisor's
failure to render the promised performance. It followed that reliance
damages should not exceed the loss caused by the promisor's failure to
perform; thus compensation for reliance should not knowingly exceed
the expectancy ceiling.' 5 Although this position obviously contradicts
the "separate wrong" idea, it has never completely laid that idea to rest.
Reliance damages continue to be viewed as somehow separate, and the
problem of the expectancy ceiling continues to be discussed in the
literature. 16
In sum, Fuller and Perdue's interest matrix is both an invitation to
open-ended policy analysis and an elusive suggestion of distinctive theo-
14 Id at 389.
15 Id at 79. Fuller and Perdue acknowledged that courts might be justified in exceeding
the expectancy ceiling if some justification for a deterrent sanction were present, id at 77, but
by classifying the excess as a deterrent they were reaffirming that it could not be
compensatory.
16 See, e.g., J. FRIEDMAN, CoNTRAcT REMEDIES IN A NUTSHELL § 3.3 (1981).
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retical properties that are never defined. Obviously, section 344 is
meant to affirm Fuller and Perdue's general policy analysis. What other
uses, if any, does the Restatement Second make of these various ideas?
B. Correcting the First Restatement
One of the obvious functions section 344 serves is to settle Fuller
and Perdue's dispute with the first Restatement over the status of reliance
damages vis-a-vis the remedy of expectancy damages. The "tenden-
tious" Comment affirming the common foundations of reliance and ex-
pectation has been deleted altogether. It has been replaced by section
344's assertion that the two remedies flow from two separate interests, as
well as by a new Comment on reliance damages which stresses that dis-
tinction. 17 The restatement of the interest matrix thus clears away the
constraining theoretical structure erected by the first Restatement.
The content of this separate reliance interest has not been devel-
oped very much by the Restatement Second's own rules of reliance-based
liability. The rules providing remedies for promises without considera-
tion and promises barred by the Statute of Frauds do not mention the
section 344 analysis.' 8 They were drafted and adopted before section
344 existed. A remark by the Reporter indicates that the use of the
interest terminology was considered at this time but was rejected, proba-
bly because of reluctance to use the terms in advance of their formal
definition. 19
The term "reliance interest" is used in only two of the Restatement
Second's operative rules-the rule of section 349, and the pair of identical
rules stated in sections 158 and 272. In each case, the use of the term
adds something of interest.
C. Section 349. The Entitlement Overtones
Section 349 authorizes reliance damages as an alternative to expec-
tancy damages. The rule is designed primarily for situations in which
17 The Comment seems almost perversely intent on making clear that reliance damages
may well exceed the expectancy where defendant cannot prove the loss of a losing contract:
Under the rule stated in this Section, the injured party may, if he
chooses, ignore the element of profit and recover as damages his expenditures
in reliance. He may choose to do this if he cannot prove his profit with rea-
sonable certainty. He may also choose to do this in the case of a losing con-
tract, one under which he would have had a loss rather than a profit. In that
case, however, it is open to the party in breach to prove the amount of the
loss, to the extent that he can do so with reasonable certainty under the stan-
dard stated in § 352, and have it subtracted from the injured party's damages.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349, Comment a (1979).
18 Id §§ 87, 89, 90 & 139.
19 Professor Farnsworth, when discussing the initial draft of§ 158 (then § 300) said that
.. I have undergone heavy fire whenever I have used the terms reliance interest and expec-
tation interest. These terms may well be used in a later Chapter of the Restatement but they
are not on the books now." 52 ALI PROCEEDINGS 403 (1975).
[Vol. 67:704
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the plaintiff cannot prove, or chooses not to prove, the value of his ex-
pectancy. It provides:
DAMAGES BASED ON RELIANCE INTEREST
As an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 347, the in-
jured party has a right to damages based on his reliance interest, in-
cluding expenditures made in preparation for performance or in
performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove with
reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered had the
contract been performed.
Section 349's treatment of the losing-contract problem reveals a
surprising dimension to the definition of "reliance interest" in section
344. Section 349 restates the Fuller and Perdue position: reliance dam-
ages should not knowingly exceed the amount that would have been
recovered if the promise had been performed. This expectancy ceiling
was not, however, made part of the section 344 definition. Section 344
defines the reliance interest as the promisee's interest in "being put in as
good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been
made."'20 Read literally, this status quo ante definition includes all reli-
ance on the contract, even reliance that exceeds the value of the expec-
tancy. Good authority exists for such a literal reading. The same status
quo ante formula was used to state the theory of restitution in the first
Restatement,2' and courts commonly cited that formula to justify recov-
ery in restitution exceeding the expectation interest. 22 Section 349 con-
firms this interpretation, characterizing the exclusion of reliance losses in
excess of the expectancy ceiling as a deduction from the sum referred to as
"damages based on his reliance interest.1 23
This definition of the reliance interest tends to amplify the confus-
ing overtones that the interest matrix has always generated. Fuller and
Perdue's definition of the reliance interest employs the same status quo
ante standard. 24 Their definition was no doubt addressed to the ordi-
nary contract situation in which this standard poses no problem, and
was not intended to govern the losing-contract problem dealt with later
in the Article. Although the Restatement Second may have intended the
same divided treatment, 25 the formality and finality of a black-letter
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1979).
21 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 347, Comment b (1932). The status quo ante stan-
dard also appears in the Restatement Second, in Comment a to § 384, but its prominence is
diluted by a greater emphasis on the "benefit" concept. See Perillo, Restitution in the Second
Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 37, 38-43 (1981).
22 E.g., Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 530 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd
on otherground, 385 U.S. 138 (1966).
23 Because § 349 provides a deduction, it is impossible to read the expectancy ceiling
into any part of§ 344. Otherwise, it might have been plausible to argue that the phrase "loss
caused by reliance on the contract" implied such a ceiling.
24 See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 54; note 2 sup ra.
25 The Illustrations in the Comments to § 344 deal with profitable contracts. Losing
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definition makes it more difficult to maintain the same sense of reserva-
tion. The black-letter form adds a sense of finality and general validity
to the idea that all promisees have some kind of prima facie equitable
claim (interest) to compensation for all reliance expenditures, without
regard to any expectancy ceiling.
Stated as a general proposition, the assertion of an entitlement to
above-expectancy reliance losses seems improper. The reliance interest
concept embraces many different entitlement claims, too varied to be
reduced to any general definition as to the expectancy ceiling.
The entitlement claim most commonly recognized is the claim
based on a promisor's duty to perform his promise. Recognition of that
duty is a way of expressing a value judgment that the promisor should
be responsible for losses caused by the failure to perform his promise.
The expectancy ceiling is an essential part of this particular value judg-
ment, for it states the critical causation element -the measure of the
loss caused by the failure to perform. The value judgment gives no basis
for any claim of entitlement going beyond that ceiling.
If the legal system never attached any other kinds of responsibility
to the act of promise-making, there would never be any entitlement to
reliance losses beyond the expectancy ceiling. The law can, however,
attach more than one kind of responsibility to the act of promise-mak-
ing. It can, as does the rule of section 349, attach responsibility for all
reliance losses where breach precludes recovery and the expectancy is
immeasurable. It could go much further. For example, the law could
attach a kind of common-venture responsibility, pursuant to which both
parties must share reliance losses caused by unforeseen disasters such as
those found in the typical mistake and impossibility cases. These other
forms of liability would not necessarily be bound by the expectancy ceil-
ing. The measure of liability for each of them would be governed by the
particular concept of duty or responsibility involved.
In this rather complex situation, no general definition of reliance-
based liability is possible. The question, rather, is whether a concept as
open-ended as the reliance interest should have been defined in black
letter at all. Any definition broad enough to make room for the more
extended types of reliance claims, as does the Section 344 definition, is
bound to give misleading conceptual signals about the core area of reli-
ance liability based on breach of the performance duty. The argument
for some black-letter recognition was strong, if only to clear away the
constraints of prior Restatement theory. Perhaps a more prudent course
would have been to make the black-letter recognition more general, and
to refrain from using the concept in operative rules.
contracts are never mentioned. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344, Com-
ments a & b; id, Illustrations 1-5 (1979).
[Vol. 67:704
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The Restatement Second's use of the term "reliance interest" as a mea-
suring standard for reliance damages creates some minor technical
problems as well. The broad definition of the term requires that some
further attention be given to the issue of the expectancy ceiling each
time that term is used in an operative rule. No problem exists in section
349, for the necessary limitation is stated correctly in the rule itself. The
rule stated in sections 158 and 272, however, provides that a court may
"grant relief on such terms as justice requires including protection of the
parties' reliance interest." Read literally, that rule authorizes compen-
sation measured by the status quo ante position. This may or may not be
appropriate, depending on the case. Actually, the problem can be
solved if one reads the reference to the "reliance interest" as subordinate
to the "as justice requires" standard, thereby allowing the term "justice"
to determine the proper measure of "reliance interest" compensation.
This is a bit clumsy, but it is the type of correction needed to control the
breadth of the reliance interest definition.
D. Sections 158 and 272. A New Cause of Action?
Sections 158 and 272 deal with cases in which a promise is excused
for reasons of mistake, frustration, or impracticability. In identical text,
they provide:
(1) In any case governed by the rules stated in this Chapter, either
party may have a claim for relief including restitution under the rules
stated in §§ 240 and [376 or 377].
(2) In any case governed by the rules stated in this Chapter, if those
rules together with the rules stated in Chapter 16 will not avoid injus-
tice, the court may grant relief on such terms as justice requires in-
cluding protection of the parties' reliance interests.
26
The exact scope of the reliance loss remedy stated in these sections,
and in their accompanying Comments and Illustrations, was obscured
by drafting changes made in the final days.27 An argument might even
26 The only difference between the two sections appears in the sections cited at the end
of subsection (1). Section 158(1) refers to the section governing restitution in mistake cases
(§ 376), and § 272(1) refers to the section governing restitution in cases involving frustration
and impracticability (§ 377).
27 Section 272 was originally introduced as § 292 in Tentative Draft No. 9 in 1974;
section 158 was originally § 300 in Tentative Draft No. 10 in 1975. Consideration of both
sections was deferred until consideration of Chapter 16 on Remedies. 52 ALI PROCEEDINGS
435 (1975); 51 ALI PROCEEDINGS 385 (1974). In 1979, a revised black-letter text of the two
sections was submitted together with Chapter 16, in Tentative Draft No. 14, and was adopted
with little discussion. 56 ALI PROCEEDINGS 301-02 (1979).
The obvious starting point for analysis is the express reference to the reliance interest in
subsection (2). Despite the very broad wording, some question could be raised whether this
text is intended to authorize money compensation. Unlike the final draft, the original draft of
these sections did not contain any reference to the reliance interest. It spoke of relief in the
form of "supplying a term [in order] to avoid injustice." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 300(2), Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 10 1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
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be made that these sections do not, in fact, authorize the award of
TRACTS § 292(1), Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 9 1974). In explaining this original remedial
power, both Comment c and the Illustrations dealt only with the sort of equitable reforma-
tion in which a court modifies the original bargain by adding new terms in order to salvage
the deal. Although the present text now speaks of "relief on such terms as justice requires
including protection of the parties' reliance interests," the original Comment c and Illustra-
tions have not been changed; they continue to explain this new language in terms of equitable
reformation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 158, Comment c, Illustrations 1-3
(1979); id § 272, Comment c, Illustrations 1-5 (Illustration 6 primarily involves restitution).
Equitable reformation could, of course, be classified as protection of the reliance interest;
reliance is usually the reason for doing so.
The Comments to §§ 158 and 272 do contain references to the award of money compen-
sation for reliance loss, but most of these references point to subsection (1). The original draft
of these sections was quite clear on this; subsection (1) provided for "relief including restitu-
tion under the rules stated in [§ 240] and prospective Chapter 16." See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 272(1) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974). At this time, it was anticipated that
Chapter 16 would provide for some type of reliance-loss recovery in this situation. See 52 ALI
PROCEEDINGS 435 (1975); 51 ALI PROCEEDINGS 385 (1974). The original Comment to sub-
section (1) (then, as now, Comment b) said so. For example, Comment b to § 272 (then 292)
said: "In a proper case recovery may go beyond mere restitution and include elements of
reliance by the claimant even though they have not benefited the other party. See prospec-
tive Chapter 16." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 292, Comment b (Tent Draft
No. 9, 1974). See also id § 300, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1975). Moreover, a few
Illustrations in the substantive sections of the mistake and impracticability chapters men-
tioned the possibility of reliance-loss liability, and these Illustrations cited subsection (1) of
§§ 158 and 272. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (then § 295), Comment
d, Illustration 8 (1979); id § 262 (then § 282), Comment a, Illustration 3; id § 265 (then §
285), Comment a, Illustration 2.
When §§ 158 and 272 were revised in 1979, the tidy structure of this provision for reli-
ance-loss compensation under subsection (1) collapsed. The reliance-interest remedy was
added to subsection (2), as already noted. As a practical matter, this seems to have been the
way of supplying the missing link, and a practical construction might well stop here. To
understand what to make of the other pieces, however, it is necessary to examine what hap-
pened to subsection 1. First, Chapter 16 turned out to contain no "rule" expressly providing
for compensation of reliance losses in the mistake-impracticability situation. Instead, it con-
tained only two sections stating a separate rule for restitution in such cases, see id §§ 376 &
377, one of which expressly states that reliance losses cannot be taken into account in restitu-
tion awards. Id § 377, Comment b. Thus, the black letter of subsection (1) was amended by
deleting the provisional reference to Chapter 16, and by adding in its place a specific refer-
ence to the appropriate restitution section (376 or 377). This change left the black letter, as it
now stands, authorizing only two specific types of relief: restitution, and the § 240 remedy of
a pro-rated price for divisible performance.
Comment b and the Illustrations citing subsection (1), however, remained unchanged.
Comment b retains the statement that relief may extend beyond restitution to reliance claims,
and the Illustrations still cite subsection (1) as authority for the award of money compensa-
tion for reliance. Id §§ 158 & 272. As authority for the statement about reliance losses,
Comment b to § 158 cites Illustration 8 to § 153, a rather appealing but remote example
based on unilateral mistake. In Comment b to § 272, the same statement is supported by a
puzzling citation to § 377, which, if anything, points to the opposite conclusion.
The final act in the reliance-loss scenario was an amendment to the Reporter's Notes for
§§ 158 and 272, made at some time after the 1974-75 tentative drafts. The addition to the
Note for § 158 is not much in point. It cites three cases that involve money damage awards in
mistake cases, but none involve reliance damages. The addition to the § 272 note, however,
cites four impractability cases which do support the proposition that reliance losses may be
compensated. Arguably, the discussion in Albre Marble & Tile Co. v. John Bowen Co., 338
Mass. 394, 155 N.E.2d 437 (1959), is also authority for recognizing a long list of bogus restitu-
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money compensation for reliance losses. 28 The intention to authorize
such compensation is reasonably clear, however, and a literal reading of
subsection (2) certainly gives that authority. Consequently, the follow-
ing discussion proceeds on the assumption that compensation of reliance
losses is authorized.
The rule of sections 158 and 272 involves an interesting extension of
the reliance interest into areas outside the normal limits of promissory
obligation. Professor Perillo has called these two sections "a new cause
of action. . . for reliance, '29 pointing out that they arise in situations in
which the duty of performance has been discharged and in which liabil-
ity cannot, therefore, be based on the breach of that duty. These sec-
tions appear to say that reliance-inducing behavior may create liability
for losses other than those caused by a promisor's wrongful failure to
perform. Such distinctive forms of reliance liability would be concrete
examples of the independent liability that the Restatement Second meant
to authorize when it recognized reliance as a separate and distinct
interest.3 0
In what sense is the remedy of sections 158 and 272 different from
contract liability and the more familiar forms of reliance liability (e.g.,
sections 90 and 139)? The distinction does not lie in the nature of the
conduct that gives rise to liability. Sections 158 and 272 apply to parties
who have made contracts, or other promises that are binding due to
reliance.31 The conduct that gives rise to sections 158 and 272 liability is
thus the same promise-making that triggers contract and other reliance
liability.
The difference is that sections 158 and 272 have recognized addi-
tional obligations arising from the same conduct. Both contract liability
and the more familiar reliance liability of sections 90 and 139 protect
the promisee by imposing an obligation upon the promisor to perform.
Breach of the duty of performance is the "wrong," and the harm to be
compensated is the loss caused by that wrong. Sections 158 and 272 go
beyond this and make promisors liable for some reliance losses that have
not been caused by wrongful nonperformance, including some that oc-
tion cases as added authority. These cases are cited in explanation of Comment c to § 272,
which means that they are meant as authority for subsection (2)!
The simplest answer to this puzzling structure is to disregard the various problems with
Comments and Illustrations, on the ground that they were drafted at an earlier date, and
then to read the black letter of subsection (2)-the only text actually adopted by the Insti-
tute-as it is written. Subsection (2) states clearly that courts may grant remedies to protect
the reliance interest if justice requires. The wording of subsection (2) requires one to accept
the somewhat anomalous proposition that its reliance interest remedy is not within "the rules
stated in Chapter 16"; the explanation, perhaps, is that § 344 is not a "rule."
28 See the second paragraph of note 28 supra.
29 Perillo, supra note 21, at 40.
30 Se notes 9-16 and accompanying text supra.
31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 158, Comment c (1979).
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cur because the promisee is unable to perform.3 2 It is difficult to be
precise about the basis and the exact dimensions of this added liability.
The justification is usually stated in terms of overall equities, and several
different and even contradictory theories of justification may be
involved.
The most distinctive theory of liability in this area would be a loss-
sharing theory which asserts that the parties to a contract are partici-
pants in a common venture, and so shouldbear common responsibility
for losses caused by unforeseen disasters for which neither party is to
blame. If one thinks about the basis of such a theory, it is evident that
the conduct being'relied upon to justify liability (for at least fifty percent,
anyway), is no more than the ordinary promise-making behavior that
began the contract venture. The liability does not depend on any fur-
ther duty to do or not do anything. It is simply an insurance-type re-
sponsibility for disaster losses, resting on the reliance-inducing promise
alone.
It may be some time before such a pure theory is stated in decisions.
The typical result in the reliance-restitution cases in this area is that
some or all of one party's reliance losses are shifted to the other. That is,
at least, the formal outcome. Where the stated outcome is an unequal
distribution of the loss (and especially where that is really the outcome),
the result obviously cannot be justified on a pure loss-sharing theory. To
justify a decision imposing an unequal distribution of the loss, some
other factor must be relied upon, either a different view of the responsi-
bility assumed by promise-making or some other conduct or omission by
the defendant that can be recognized as creating a superior responsibil-
ity for the loss.
One justification for such unequal distribution could be a different
value judgment about the responsibility that arises from the promise-
making behavior itself. That is, one might argue that the party whose
performance is being excused should be liable for the other's reliance.
This implies another form of absolute liability. Unlike the loss-sharing
version, however, it entails the conclusion that each party assumes total
responsibility for the other's reliance losses if its own performance is
excused.
Other justifications may be based on particular aspects of the
promise-making behavior-for example, where loss imposition is justi-
fied because the defendant initiated the project, or had superior knowl-
32 Subsection 2 of §§ 158 and 272 authorizes courts to grant relief in order to protect
"the parties' reliance interest." The use of the plural possessive extends the protection to
either party's reliance interest, including the party whose performance duty is being excused
because of mistake or impracticability/frustration. Three of the four cases cited by the Re-
porter's Note in support of subsection (2) of § 272 involve recovery by the party whose duty
has been excused. Ste note 33 infra.
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edge of the risk. The liability here has a fault-oriented character, and its
logic resembles the justification for conventional misrepresentation lia-
bility. Still other justifications may be found in conduct occurring after
the contract is made. These justifications would also involve fault-ori-
ented judgments, as where the defendant's conduct has somehow con-
tributed to the disaster, or the defendant has failed to make use of
superior ability to prevent or insure against it. Justifications of this kind
suggest that promise-making also creates a lesser duty not to endanger
the other party's reliance investment, a theory whose logic resembles or-
dinary tort liability.
The various theories suggested by sections 158 and 272 illustrate
two important facets of a conceptual structure that treats the reliance
interest as a separate basis of liability. First, these theories demonstrate
that the independent analysis of reliance claims can identify bases of
liability that are more than just the extension of a contract-type duty of
performance. It is evident that other, quite distinctive duties may also
flow from reliance-inducing behavior.
Second, the recognition of these other types of liability shows that
there is not necessarily a single measure of reliance liability. The meas-
ure of recovery will necessarily depend on the discrete value judgments
underlying the particular concept of liability at issue. For example, a
loss-sharing theory necessarily implies liability limited to fifty percent of
combined reliance losses. Moreover, that theory may or may not mean
an expectancy ceiling on the amount of reliance losses to be shared. The
recognition of an insurance-type responsibility for disaster losses could
well include the judgment that both parties ought to share at least one
kind of over-expectancy expense as well-the extra expense that a party
incurs in a good-faith effort to overcome the excusing difficulties that
both parties failed to foresee. Likewise, a theory of liability based on the
conclusion that the defendant has somehow warranted or misrepre-
sented the feasibility of the plaintiff's performance could also lead to
liability for more-than-expectancy losses, but in this case the justifica-
tion would be that the defendant's particular conduct (the representa-
tion of feasibility) was an important cause of the plaintiff's excess
expenditures.
The Restatement Second does little to develop the theory or dimen-
sions of the remedy stated in sections 158 and 272. The Comments give
a sense of broad equitable power to do what is fair, suggesting that it is
impossible to generalize in view of the infinite variety of equitable con-
siderations that may arise in this area. The Illustrations and case cita-
tions relevant to the reliance remedy present a mixture of apparent
theories, many of which appear to rely only slightly on extended ideas of
1982]
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loss sharing.33 The reliance interest concept opens the door to a wide-
ranging analysis, but the articulation of the particular theories of sec-
tions 158 and 272 awaits further judicial development.
II
THE RELIANCE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Section 349 of the Restatement Second establishes a special remedy for
"damages based on [the promisee's] reliance interest." It allows the
plaintiff to recover such reliance losses without having to prove the
value of the expectancy.
In contrast to the terms "expectation interest" and "restitution in-
terest," both of which embody an extensive case law furnishing detailed
rules of application, 34 neither the term "reliance interest" nor the more
common expressions "reliance loss" or "reliance damages" are very well
developed. This section examines the guidance furnished by the Restate-
ment Second on a few of the central issues in defining the concept of reli-
ance damages under section 349.
33 The one pertinent illustration cited in the Comment to § 158 is a mistaken bid case,
in which the party guilty of the unilateral mistake is made to pay the reliance expenses of the
other party as a condition of being excused from his contract duty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 153, Illustration 8 (1979). It takes very little loss-sharing to explain the
result.
A shade less blatant, but still fairly obvious, is the degree of fault involved in three of the
four cases cited in the Reporter's Note to § 272. In Hol-Gar Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 360
F.2d 634, 638 (Ct. Cl. 1966) and Maxwell Dynamometer Co. v. United States, 386 F.2d 855,
872 (Ct. Cl. 1967), liability rested on the conclusion that, by providing specifications that
called for performance that was not feasible, the United States was warranting or represent-
ing to the other party that the performance was feasible. Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec.
Ass'n, 518 P.2d 76, 82-85 (Alaska), modi;fed on rehearing, 523 P.2d 1243, 1245-46 (1974), aj'd,
562 P.2d 1053 (1977), relied on Hol-Gar and Maxwell in holding that a public utility under-
takes similar responsibility for reliance losses when, with superior knowledge, it uses its con-
tract rights to insist upon further efforts to perform after it should have become aware of the
impossibility of performance. Liability in Chugach was limited to the additional reliance ex-
penditures caused by the utility's insistence on performance. In all three of these cases, inci-
dentally, recovery was in favor of the party who was seeking to be excused from performance.
Albre Marble & Tile Co. v. John Bowen Co., 338 Mass. 394, 155 N.E.2d 437 (1959) also
mentions fault as a prominent factor-the fault being the general contractor's erroneous bid-
ding procedure which led to the general contract being declared illegal. Nevertheless, the
court also discussed more general ideas of loss-sharing, and gave the appearance that the fault
issue was only one of many equities that were involved.
Finally, the two most pertinent Illustrations cited in Comment b to section 272 do not
contain any conspicuous issues of fault on either side; they are straightforward cases of super-
vening frustration or impossibility. While both Illustrations could be taken to suggest a loss-
sharing approach, both involve liability imposed on the party whose duty is being discharged.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 262, Illustration 3 (1979); id § 265, Illustration 2.
The Illustrations to §§ 158 and 272 themselves do not deal with the issue of compensa-
tion for reliance losses. For a general explanation of what Illustrations are cited where and
why, see note 27 supra.
34 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 347, 348 & 371 (1979). Apart from
these master definitions, the measures are refined and elaborated throughout the Comments
and Illustrations of Topics 2 and 4 of Chapter 16.
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A. Out-of-Pocket Expenses vs. Foregone Opportunities
Fuller and Perdue's definition of the reliance interest included not
only direct out-of-pocket expenditures in reliance on a promise, but also
opportunities, such as alternative contracts, that are foregone in reliance
on the promise at issue.35 Fuller and Perdue defined the interest
broadly, reserving for later consideration questions about the particular
legal effects that various kinds of reliance ought to have. Although they
confessed doubts whether the loss of the foregone opportunities should
be compensated in situations where enforcement of the full expectation
was precluded, they did not offer a firm conclusion. 36 The rule of sec-
tion 349 raises this issue squarely.
Courts will look with disfavor on the broader claims of reliance loss
under section 349. The section states a separate and easier standard of
proof for damages. The more favored treatment is based on the percep-
tion that the type of loss in question has a particularly compelling char-
acter. The discrete ethical appeal of reliance losses is the perception that
the plaintiff has been made "worse off" than before. Out-of-pocket ex-
penditures fit within this notion quite comfortably, because they involve
a clear diminution of existing assets. Foregone opportunities appear less
clear, because it is more difficult to regard opportunities for gain as pres-
ent assets.
Arguably, courts could make a distinction simply based on cer-
tainty. That is, if a party to a contract can prove the loss of a foregone
opportunity and its value with the requisite certainty, then courts
should treat the opportunity like a present asset, and the foregoing of
that opportunity like a worse-off reliance loss. 37 More complex percep-
tions of gain and loss, however, will probably come into play. For exam-
ple, there is likely to be a distinction between opportunities that involve
entrepreneurial gain and those that involve wages. Opportunities that
involve wages (the foregoing of an existing or clearly available job) will
make an attractive claim, for working time is usually perceived as a
present asset, and its value is typically measured by opportunity cost.
Opportunities that involve entrepreneurial gain, on the other hand,
have a stubborn tendency to look like gain wherever they come up. It
will be difficult for a court to award out-of-pocket reliance on the con-
35 See note 2 suplra.
36 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 417-18.
37 Even if the certainty test does not validate claims for foregone opportunity, it should
play an important role in the opposite direction-that is, in excluding such claims. The typical
opportunity foregone when making a contract is the opportunity to contract with someone
else for the same performance. If a party cannot prove the value of the contracted-for per-
formance (the only case that we need to worry about), it is highly unlikely that he will be able
to prove the value of the alternative contract foregone. The only case of foregone opportunity
likely to surmount the certainty barrier is the case of the promisee who gives up an existing, or
at least relatively certain, business opportunity in order to take advantage of a more specula-
tive, uncertain, or intangible opportunity offered by the promisor.
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tract and lost profit on a foregone alternative venture, without feeling
that such a recovery leaves the plaintiff "better off."
'38
Section 344's definition of reliance interest appears to say very little
on this point. The definition has two parts: the promisee is to be reim-
bursed for (1) "loss caused by reliance on the contract" by (2) "being
put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not
been made."'39 The first part of the definition could include almost any
form of detrimental reliance. The key question is whether "loss" in-
cludes a foregone opportunity. Similarly, the second part of the defini-
tion turns on the word "position"-implying asset position, but leaving
open the ultimate question of what things constitute assets.
The black letter of section 349 merely incorporates the section 344
term "reliance interest." Comment a to section 349 uses the word "ex-
penditure" as synonymous with "reliance loss." For example, the Com-
ment says, "[u]nder the rule stated in this Section, the injured party may
. . .recover as damages his expenditures in reliance." Expenditure is
considerably less pliable than loss or position, but it also ultimately turns
on one's concept of assets. Thus, the word is probably broad enough to
encompass claims for foregone wages, especially if the loss were re-
phrased as working time invested in the contract. It would be difficult,
however, to make the word "expenditure" fit a foregone business
opportunity.
The Illustrations of reliance damages in section 344 and 349 all in-
volve the expenditure of money. The only Illustration that treats a fore-
gone opportunity as a damage issue is Illustration 10 to section 90,
which restates Hqfinan v. Red OwlStores, Inc. 40 The issue in that case was
the compensability of prospective grocery store income that had been
foregone when the plaintiff sold his grocery store in reliance on the de-
fendant's promise to award him a Red Owl franchise. Technically, the
issue in both the section 90 Illustration and the case itself was not
whether such foregone income was a reliance loss, but rather whether
justice required compensation of that item in a promissory estoppel ac-
tion.4 1 Both the court and the Illustration answered in the negative.
Notwithstanding the different issue involved, both explanations imply a
characterization of the foregone income as something outside the cate-
gory of reliance loss. The court stated that "U]ustice does not require
that the damages. . . should exceed any actual loss sustained .... -42
38 "[I]t is in the field of gains prevented that the reliance and expectation interests tend
to lose their separate identities." Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 417 (footnote omitted).
Fuller and Perdue acknowledge that most persons perceive wages differently, even though
they could see no logical distinction. Id at 418.
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(b) (1979).
40 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
41 Id at 701, 133 N.W.2d at 276.
42 Id at 702, 133 N.W.2d at 277.
[Vol. 67:704
RELIANCE INTEREST
Illustration 10 states that "[s]ince the proposed agreement was never
made,. . . [the plaintiff] is not entitled to lost profits from the sale of the
grocery or to his expectation interest in the proposed franchise. .... ,,43
On the whole, the Restatement Second appears to lean toward limiting
the concept of reliance losses under section 349 to something like out-of-
pocket expenditures, in apparent agreement with the "better-off/worse-
off" distinction suggested earlier. Still, the black-letter definitions them-
selves leave considerable room for interpretation, and that is not neces-
sarily undesirable. The border line is vague, and case-by-case resolution
appropriate.
B. Overhead and Pre-Contract Expenses
Not all out-of-pocket losses are reliance losses. The Comment to
section 349 states that reliance losses do not include fixed overhead ex-
penses charged to the contract. The reason for this exclusion is that the
concept of reliance requires a traceable causal connection between the
making of the expenditure and the contract; the contract promise must
induce the expenditure. Because fixed expenses are by definition in-
curred whether or nor the particular contract is undertaken, the causal
link between the expense and the contract does not exist. The theory
that excludes fixed expenses actually excludes any expenses or obliga-
tions to incur future expenses made before the parties entered into the
contract, whether the expenses are deemed fixed or variable with regard
to the overall transaction to which they relate.
Because the issue is causation, a certain flexibility as to the time line
can be anticipated. Flexibility is most likely to appear when pre-con-
tract expenses make a particularly appealing claim, as in the case
where, although the value of the expectancy cannot be proved, the cir-
cumstances suggest that the plaintiff would have recovered all pre-con-
tract expenses had the contract been performed. In such a case courts
may adopt various time-bending constructions to justify awarding the
pre-contract expenses as reliance damages. The most familiar example
is Security Stove & Manufacturing Co. v. American Railway Express Co., in
43 RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, Illustration 10 (1979). The implica-
tion of Illustration 10, that things might be different if the parties had concluded the franchise
contract, could give one second thoughts about its message concerning reliance losses.
Clearly, concluding the franchise contract would have given the plaintiff a claim for ordinary
expectancy damages-the lost profits of the franchise agreement. Is the Illustration also say-
ing, however, that in the absence of provable franchise profits, the plaintiff could claim lost
grocery-store profits as a § 349 reliance loss? If so, the Illustration points in a direction con-
trary to the out-of-pocket concept that I am suggesting.
Although this possibility must be recognized, my reason for not so interpreting the Illus-
tration is its characterization of the foregone grocery profits as "lost profits," and the seem-
ingly parallel treatment that it gives to these lost profits and the actual expectancy profits of
the franchise.
44 227 Mo. App. 175, 184, 51 S.W.2d 572, 577 (1932).
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which the court held that a common carrier's duty to accept shipments
from the public made it possible for the plaintiff to rely on the shipment
contract before it was actually concluded. Pre-contract negotiations
may possibly generate a similar reliance link to pre-contract expenses.
45
The distinction between reliance expenditures and other out-of-
pocket expenses complicates the losing-contract calculation under the
rule of section 349. In cases where the claim for reliance expenses in-
cludes only some of the total out-of-pocket expenses, it will not be
enough for the defendant to show that the total return from perform-
ance would have fallen short of total costs. 46 The fact that revenues
would not have covered the plaintiff's fixed and pre-contract expendi-
tures will be immaterial. If the return would have covered only the reli-
ance costs, then the plaintiff is not being made better off if he now
recovers damages for them.
If the breach results in a saving, whether from salvage of pre-con-
tract expenses, reassignment of fixed expenses to another contract made
possible by the breach, or saving of variable costs not yet expended, this
saving will have to be deducted from the projected return. That
reduced figure must then be the basis of the comparison with the reli-
ance claim. For example, if the projected return is just enough to cover
100% of the reliance expenses, and if the breach has enabled plaintiff to
salvage some pre-contract expense, a court should not award all of the
reliance expenses. Full recovery of reliance expenses would, when added
to the saving, put plaintiff in a better position than performance would
have.
How often these losing-contract problems will appear is an open
question. Section 349 is designed for cases in which neither side can
prove the expectancy. Many plaintiffs, however, may be tempted to
seek section 349 reliance damages in cases where they clearly have a
losing contract in the hope that the breaching party will not be able to
prove so. A section 349 claim might become a common companion to a
restitution claim in such circumstances, particularly if courts accept the
Restatement Second's invitation to tighten the concept of benefit in restitu-
tion actions.
47
45 The situation that I have in mind is not the promise-induced pre-contract reliance of
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965), but Hoffran-like
reliance that takes place during the negotiation of a contract that is actually concluded, based
simply on the plaintiff's (correct) judgment that the deal is going to go through.
46 The text of § 349 could be read the other way, because it speaks of deducting "any
loss. . . the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed." The refer-
ences in all four Illustrations to proving the "profit or loss [plaintiff] would have made" give
the same impression that "loss" means the final overall result. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 349, Illustrations 1-4 (1979). For the reasons stated in the text, that interpreta-
tion makes no sense if, as I assume, the object here is to apply the expectancy ceiling.
47 Whether intentionally or not, the reliance damages and restitution provisions of the
Restatement Second, read together, produce a subtle design for law reform that could produce
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C. Essential and Incidental Reliance
The Comment to section 349 makes clear that its special rule for
reliance damages applies both to "essential" and "incidental" reliance
expenditures. The essential/incidental distinction is Fuller and Per-
due's. 48 As generally understood, the two categories cover the field; reli-
ance that is not essential is incidental. The Comment tells us, therefore,
that the section 349 rule for recovery of reliance losses applies to all reli-
ance losses.
The Comment confirms an important change made by the black
letter of section 349. The first Restatement rule authorizing recovery of
reliance damages (section 333) limited recovery to "expenditure[s] rea-
sonably made in performance of the contract or in preparation there-
for."'49 This limitation excluded from recovery reliance expenditures
invested in collateral transactions, the type of reliance expenditure that
Fuller and Perdue labeled incidental. Fuller and Perdue criticized the
limitation as being contrary to the overwhelming weight of the case law,
even in 1932.50 The section 349 black letter of the Restatement Second
signals somewhat obliquely the elimination of the prepara-
considerable business for § 349 if it works. The design unfolds like this: Over the years,
courts have expanded the concept of "benefit" in restitution law in order to compensate pure
reliance losses that, for one reason or another, fell outside the area in which contract remedies
operate. One of the unfortunate by-products of this development has been a tendency to
compensate reliance losses in excess of the expectancy ceiling, because under restitution doc-
trine the remedy for unjust enrichment is not limited by the contract expectancy. The Restate-
ment Second relieves this pressure on the restitution remedy by granting or expanding reliance
remedies in several needed areas, especially § 349 and §§ 139, 158, and 272. It also introduces
some tightening into the benefit concept of restitution law, albeit at the same time also recog-
nizing broader concepts of benefit that are by now too well established to ignore. See Perillo,
supra note 21, at 38-43. The result is a potentially narrower restitution standard that will
permit and encourage courts to redirect reliance claims into the new reliance remedies. To
the extent this happens, reliance-loss claims based on losing contracts will be dealt with under
the rules of § 349.
48 Fuller & Perdue, supra note I, at 78.
49 Section 333 of the first Restatement provided:
WHEN DAMAGES MAY BE MEASURED BY
EXPENDITURES IN PART PERFORMANCE
The amount of the plaintiff's expenditure, reasonably made in perform-
ance of the contract or in necessary preparation therefor, is included in com-
pensatory damages, with the following limitations:
(a) Such expenditures are not recoverable in excess of the full contract price
promised by the defendant.
(b) Expenditures in preparation are not recoverable unless they can fairly be
regarded as part of the cost of performance in estimating profit and loss.
(c) Instalments [sic] of the contract price already received and the value of
materials on hand that would have been consumed in completion must be
deducted.
(d) If full performance would have resulted in a net loss to the plaintiff, the
amount of this loss must be deducted, the burden of proof being on the
defendant.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 333 (1932).
50 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 90-92. On the related issue of whether the "contract
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tion/performance limitation, authorizing recovery of "damages based
on [the promisee's] reliance interest, including expenditures made in
preparation for performance or in performance."51
The essential/incidental terminology raises many ghosts. Fuller
and Perdue invented the distinction to make an important point about
the expectancy ceiling for reliance damages. Unfortunately, their expla-
nation of the distinction was one of the least clearly expressed ideas in
their article, and not everyone agrees on its exact meaning.52 This lack
of clarity seems to be at the root of some rather puzzling statements in
the Restatement Second's discussion of the expectancy ceiling on reliance
damages.
The difficulty with the essential/incidental distinction arises pri-
marily because two distinctions, rather than one, lurk in this terminol-
ogy. One is the distinction between reliance that is required to satisfy a
contract duty, and reliance that is not. Examples of the former, which
might be called obligatory reliance,53 would be: (1) expenditures by a
contractor in preparation to perform, and in performance of, the serv-
ices called for by the contract; (2) expenditures by a seller of goods to
purchase or manufacture the goods required by the contract; and (3)
expenditures by a franchisee to rent a store, hire salesmen, and promote
sales of the franchised product, under a franchise contract that requires
the franchisee to do so. Examples of the latter, which might be called
nonobligatory reliance, would be: (1) expenditures by a purchaser of a
retail store for a stock of goods he intends to sell in the store; (2) expendi-
tures by a buyer of industrial machines for other equipment and fur-
nishings needed to make profitable use of the purchased machines; and
(3) expenditures by a lessee of a theater to prepare a series of theater
performances, under a theater lease that provides for a fixed rental and
contains no obligation to perform anything.
The second distinction lurking in the essential/incidental terminol-
ogy relates to the issue of whether reliance expenditures would have
been recovered had the breaching party performed. Reliance expendi-
tures are an investment made in expectation of some transfer of value in
return in value. In order to determine whether reliance expenditures
would have been recovered, it is necessary to identify the value-produc-
ing transaction that would have covered the expenditures. Two types of
price" should be a ceiling on recovery of § 349 damages, see notes 58-59 and accompanying
text infta.
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (1979) (emphasis added).
52 See, e.g., the text accompanying note 65 infra, disagreeing with Judge Hand's applica-
tion of the distinction in L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir.
1949).
53 The term "obligatory" is not a perfect one, for it might be read to suggest a distinc-
tion between performance and preparing to perform. I mean to include both. The idea is
reliance that is devoted to the satisfaction of a contract duty.
[Vol. 67:704
RELIANCE INTEREST
value-producing transactions may be distinguished. One is the value
received by obtaining the promised performance itself, such as the price
received by a seller of goods. The other is value received from conse-
quential transactions that would have been undertaken on the basis of
the promised performance-for example, where the contract involves
the purchase of business premises, the revenues that would have been
received from the business being located there.
54
In the case where reliance expenditures look solely to the value of
the return performance, it is clear that such expenditures would only
have been recovered up to the value of the return performance. In such
cases, the "contract price" (i.e., the value of the return performance) is a
ceiling upon reliance damages. Where, however, a party invests the reli-
ance expenditures in other, consequential transactions, the ceiling on
recovery is the expected return from those consequential transactions.
That is, in order to determine whether the reliance expenditures would
have been recovered, it is necessary to determine the amount of value
these consequential transactions would have produced.
This second distinction may be termed the distinction between di-
rect reliance and consequential reliance. Some illustrations are helpful.
Consider the three examples of obligatory reliance given earlier. The
first two examples-the contractor investing in the performance of his
promised service, and the seller of goods investing in his promised
goods-are instances of direct reliance. They are expenditures invested
solely in the value of the return performance; to the extent that they
exceed the value of the return performance, they would not have been
recovered by performance.
The third example, involving preparation expenses by a franchisee,
is an instance of consequential reliance. The return performance by the
franchisor is merely the granting of the franchise rights. The fran-
chisee's expenditures may be a contractual obligation, necessary to earn
the legal right to the franchisor's return performance, but the expenses
are actually an investment in a transaction that is consequential to
54 Fuller and Perdue make the point that the income to be derived from consequential
transactions can be described as being part of the value of the contracted-for property; for
example, the capitalized income that a machine can earn can be said to be the machine's
"value," as much as its market price. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 75-76. I find the
point, and the concepts of "objective" and "subjective" value that they developed in order to
deal with it, needlessly confusing. If a piece of property has consequential value and the loss
of that property prevents the realization of that consequential value, what one wants to know
is how much it would have earned, and what it would have cost to do so. Nothing is gained
by adding a step that requires us to recalculate this data so that we may speak of it as the
property's value.
The objective-subjective terminology also confuses communication about another issue
where one would normally use the term subjective, namely, the case where the consequential
transaction is of personal (subjective) rather than economic value. For example, a sportsman




granting the franchise, namely the expected revenues from the sale of
the franchised product to the public. It is the revenue from sales, not
the abstract value of the franchise right, that would have covered these
reliance expenditures. In this case it would not be proper to use the
contract price (the fair market value of the franchise right) as a ceiling
on the amount of expenditures that could be recovered as reliance
damages.
Which of these two distinctions did Fuller and Perdue's essen-
tial/incidental distinction mean to signal? The functional purpose of
the distinction points in one direction, while the words point in the
other. Fuller and Perdue's purpose was to define when the contract
price should and should not be a ceiling on reliance damages. 55 This
should have led to the direct/consequential distinction, which looks at
the value-producing transaction in which the reliance was invested.
Fuller and Perdue's terminology, however, pointed toward the obliga-
tory/nonobligatory distinction, as did their much-quoted explanation
that essential reliance was "in a loose sense the 'price' of whatever bene-
fits the contract may involve for the plaintiff."5 6
The Restatement Second's description of the essential/incidental dis-
tinction retains the ambiguity found in Fuller and Perdue. Comment a
to section 349 states:
Often the reliance consists of preparation for performance or actual
performance of the contract, and this is sometimes called "essential
reliance." See, for example, Illustration 3. It may, however, also con-
sist of preparation for collateral transactions that a party plans to
carry out when the contract in question is performed, and this is
sometimes called "incidental" reliance. See Illustration 4.
The reference to the Illustrations brings the ambiguity into focus. Illus-
55 Id at 75-79.
56 Id at 78. Fuller and Perdue go on to name a category of acts which seems to be based
on the idea of performing legal obligations. The conclusion that they meant obligatory reli-
ance would not be a distortion of what they said.
The reliance damage provision of the first Restatement (§ 333) employed a concept of
obligatory reliance in defining compensable reliance. See note 49 supra. Fuller and Perdue
attacked this limitation, primarily because it excluded the many kinds of consequential reli-
ance that courts were already compensating, most of which were instances of nonobligatory
reliance, such as the planting of crops in the seed cases. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 90-
92. It is at least possible that, when discussing the expectancy ceiling, the authors were led to
define the direct/consequential distinction in terms of the somewhat different distinction that
§ 333 had employed to precipitate the debate over recoverability.
It is doubtful that the similarity between obligatory reliance and the restitution concept
of "benefit" had any direct bearing on the matter. Benefit in restitution law is a favored
classification, because of the ethical appeal of the fact that the defendant has bargained for
the reliance involved, and thus can more readily be made responsible for paying for it. Essen-
tial reliance in Fuller and Perdue's distinction is a disfavored classification, for it subjects the
reliance in question to a contract-price ceiling on recovery. The benefit concept may, of
course, have influenced the § 333 definition, and in that way have introduced the idea of
obligatory reliance into the field.
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trations 3 and 4 themselves are correctly classified according to the defi-
nition suggested here; the former is clearly direct reliance (construction
expenditures under a building contract), and the latter is clearly conse-
quential reliance (expenditures by the purchaser of a retail store for the
stock of goods he intends to sell in the store). But what of Illustrations 1
and 2? The "for example" in Comment a suggests that Illustrations 1
and 2 are two other examples of essential reliance. Yet in fact, both are
difficult borderline cases where the ambiguities of the essen-
tial/incidental distinction can lead one astray. Illustration 1 is the ex-
ample used in this Article to illustrate consequential reliance that also
happens to be obligatory-the franchisee's promotion and start-up ex-
penses. Illustration 2 involves a joint-venture theatre production, where
formal classification as direct or consequential depends on just how the
venture is set up, but where in either case the reliance expenses of pre-
paring the production are an investment in sales of tickets to the pub-
lic.5 7 An understanding of the essential/incidental distinction which
suggested that the contract price is the relevant ceiling for reliance dam-
ages in either of these two cases would very likely lead to an improper
analysis.
Another passage in Comment a to section 349 also demonstrates
the need for clarity here. It states:
If the injured party's expenditures exceed the contract price, it is clear
that at least to the extent of the excess, there would have been a loss.
For this reason, recovery for expenditures under the rule stated in this
section may not exceed the full contract price.
If the Comment means to use the term "contract price" in its normally
accepted sense-the value of the defendant's performance-the quoted
passage would be a correct statement of the expectancy ceiling for direct
reliance expenditures. It would not, however, be a correct statement of
57 A contracts with B to stage a series of performances in B's theater, each to
have 50 per cent of the gross receipts. After A has spent $20,000 in getting
ready for the performances, B rents the theater to others and repudiates the
contract, and A stages the performance at another theater. A's expenditures
in preparation for performance of the contract with B are worth $8,000 to
him in connection with staging the performances at the other theater. If
neither party proves with reasonable certainty what profit or loss A would
have made if the contract had been performed, A can recover as damages the
$12,000 balance of his expenditures in preparation for performance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349, Illustration 2 (1979).
If we view this as a simple employment-type arrangement, B's promised performance
(the contract price) is to pay 50% of the gross receipts, and this can be called direct reliance.
If we consider this to be a demise of the theater to ,4, however, with A's rent being to pay 50%
of the gross receipts to B (plus a good-faith obligation to put on some production), the reli-
ance would be consequential, even though obligatory. In either case, the prospective reve-
nues of the production constitute the ceiling on reliance expenditures. The latter case could
be confusing if one began with the assumption that the contract price was a ceiling; the only
performance promised by B would be the demise of the premises, and one could wind up
thinking that the fair market value of the rental was relevant datum.
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the expectancy ceiling for consequential reliance expenditures. The
statement might, of course, have been intended to place a cap on dam-
ages for consequential reliance, possibly as a way of limiting potentially
excessive recovery under the generous rule of section 349. A contract-
price ceiling, however, would simply be too drastic for that purpose.58
Moreover, it is hard to imagine such a purpose after Fuller and Perdue
had so effectively attacked the contract-price limitation in the predeces-
sor provision of to the first Restatement. 5 9 That meaning becomes even
less plausible given that Illustrations 1 and 4 to section 349 involve con-
sequential reliance, and point to the outcome of the appropriate conse-
quential transactions as the appropriate ceiling.
According to Fuller and Perdue's analysis, the troublesome state-
ment should say that the ceiling on reliance damages is the value of the
expectation interest. The statement itself will probably be read that
way when the need arises.
D. Limiting Damages for Consequential Reliance
If the only ceiling on reliance damages under section 349 is the ex-
pectancy ceiling,60 then large awards for consequential reliance expendi-
tures will be relatively easy to prove. The rule stated in section 349 does
not distinguish between different types of reliance. The test for recover-
ability is the same for all: proof of the reliance expense, subject to the
defendant's opportunity to prove that the expenses would not have been
recovered upon performance. If the defendant cannot prove the value
of the expectancy, the plaintiff can recover all consequential reliance
expenditures.
Although actual reliance expenditures clearly present a more com-
pelling case for relief than lost profits, claims for consequential reliance
expenditures can raise many of the same concerns about remoteness and
disproportion that lead courts to look for ways of limiting consequential
damages generally. For claims made under section 349, these concerns
are likely to be intensified because of the rather limited proof required.
The best illustration of this potential problem is found in a case
which serves as one of the leading authorities for section 349 itself, L
Albert & Sons v. Armstrong Rubber Co.6' The case involved the sale of four
58 Any recovery for consequential reliance losses would be ruled out in cases where the
plaintiff demands both return of the price and compensation for expenditures made in at-
tempting to use the defective product. A contract price ceiling would also, inter alia, overrule
the recovery in Fuller's favorite case, Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. Express
Co., 227 Mo. App. 175, 51 S.W.2d 572 (1932), where the court awarded reliance damages of
$801.50 on a contract of carriage costing $192.12 for freight and express charges.
59 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 95. See generally id at 89-95. The first Restatement
provision was § 333. See note 49 supra.
60 See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
61 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949).
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rubber reconditioning machines which the buyer intended to use to pro-
duce reclaimed rubber. The sale price was approximately $25,000. In
reliance on the contract, the buyer made unsalvageable expenditures of
approximately $118,000 for other equipment in its rubber reclaim de-
partment, $28,000 for rubber scrap, and $3,000 for laying a special foun-
dation to support the four machines. The buyer asserted that late
delivery of the machines caused the collapse of the entire reclaim de-
partment, and claimed all these reliance expenses as damages.
The federal district court ruled that the buyer failed to prove its
damages. Specifically, the court found that the buyer had not proved
that the delay in delivery of the machines caused the collapse of the
reclaim department. Delayed delivery, the court concluded, was only
one of several possible causes.
The court of appeals agreed with the district court's conclusion as
to causation. It agreed that this conclusion barred the claims of
$118,000 for the reclaim department and $28,000 for the scrap rubber,
saying that "[s]uch a possibility is not sufficient proof of causation to
impose liability on the plaintiffs for the cost of all machinery and sup-
plies for the reclaim department. ' 62 This part of the decision is often
not mentioned, but it is the key to approaching the other holding in the
case.
The court of appeals proceeded to hold that the claim for the
$3,000 foundation was different. It classified this item as an expense
"necessary to prepare for performance," 63 implying that the other two
items were something different. As to this one item, the court invoked
the rule now stated in section 349: the plaintiff was entitled to the reli-
ance expense (the $3,000), unless the defendant could prove that the
expense would not have been recovered through the prospective earn-
ings of the four machines. In effect, the court changed the burden of
proof on causation for this one item.
The court's separate analysis of the $3,000 foundation expenditure
cannot be explained in economic terms. All three of the buyer's invest-
ments were investments in the reclaim department. All three expendi-
tures would have been covered solely by the income from refining
operations. If the department never ran, the plaintiff would not have
recovered any of these expenditures. Analytically, the trial court was
correct in treating all three items alike; all three rise or fall on the same
causation question.
The appellate court's reasons for distinguishing the $3,000 are sim-
ply wrong. Its statement that laying the foundations was "necessary to
prepare for performance" was apparently the basis of this distinction,




because it subsequently quoted the same language as it appears in sec-
tion 333 of the first Restatement, the rule authorizing the award of reli-
ance damages.4 The court also labeled the foundation expense as
"essential reliance" under Fuller and Perdue's dichotomy. 65 Apparently
the court's idea was that the foundation expense was direct and/or obli-
gatory reliance, and thus different in kind from the consequential, non-
obligatory expenditures for the reclaim department and the rubber
scrap. No such distinction was possible. The foundation expenditure
certainly was not direct reliance, for as the court itself conceded, it could
have been covered only by income from the refining operation. Nor was
it obligatory reliance required by the contract, because the buyer's only
contractual obligation was to pay the price.
The reason for the court's divided treatment seems obvious. The
transaction took place near the end of World War II. The court noted
that the market for reclaimed rubber was collapsing at the time that the
department was about to commence operations.66 Even if the machines
had arrived on time, it was quite doubtful that the buyer would have
commenced operations, or if it had, that it would have earned any
money. In this situation, it seems that the court simply was not willing
to give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt when it came to substantial
damage claims. True, the court did give the plaintiff the very small
amount represented by the $3,000 foundation expense, but in retrospect
this looks like a token recognition of the legal wrong.
Consider how the rules of the Restatement Second would apply to the
type of problem illustrated by L. Albert &Sons. If it is correct to say that
no distinction exists between any of the three reliance claims, then the
rule of section 349 must apply to all of them. This means that the de-
fendant will be prima facie liable for all three reliance expenditures,
unless it can prove that the plaintiff would not have recovered them
upon performance. Cases will exist, of course, where the evidence of
likely loss is strong enough to permit courts to find that the defendant
has met its burden. On occasion, courts may even be able to compro-
mise by finding that only a partial loss has been proved. In short, room
exists within the rule of section 349 itself to eliminate the most trouble-
some cases.
For cases in which the evidence of causation and expectancy value
is simply too uncertain to justify a finding for defendants, the Restatement
Second offers other doctrinal methods of containment. Reliance dam-
ages are subject to all the rules stated for contract damages generally.
Doctrines of certainty and foreseeability have traditionally been
manipulated to control consequential damage claims deemed excessive.
64 Id at 190.
65 Id at 191.
66 Id at 186.
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The certainty requirement of section 352 will not be much help, given
the limited proof that section 349 requires. 67 A strict application of the
foreseeability test in section 351 (1) and (2) might be used, but the Re-
statement Second provides a new rule asking courts to deal with such issues
openly. Section 351(3) states:
A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery
for loss of profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reli-
ance, or otherwise if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so
requires in order to avoid disproportionate compensation.
The relationship between section 351(3) and reliance damages must
be carefully analyzed. The rule's reference to reliance damages as a pos-
sibly suitable compromise does not, in terms, apply to reliance damages
proved solely under section 349. The section is addressed to a situation
in which a court wishes to limit damages. The only case in which an
award of reliance damages can be viewed as a limitation is one in which
the plaintiff has proved, or can prove, the full expectation measure of
recovery-that reliance expenses plus anticipated profits would have
been recovered had the contract been performed. The award of section
349 damages would never be called a limitation, because the proof given
under section 349 never entitles the plaintiff to any more than reliance
damages in the first place.
In addition, section 351(3) by no means creates a presumption in
favor of reliance damages. It goes on to state that courts have a general
power to limit consequential damages "if. . .justice so requires in order
to avoid disproportionate compensation." The rationale stated for this
general power refers to factors such as a relatively small contract price in
relation to the size of the consequential-damage claim. It states that
such factors .can be evidence that the parties did not intend to make the
defendant assume the risk of the much larger consequential transactions
based on the contract. 68 If this rationale about nonassumption of risk is
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352, Comment a (1979).
68 Comment f to § 351 provides:
Other limitations on damages. It is not always in the interest of justice to
require the party in breach to pay damages for all of the foreseeable loss that
he has caused. There are unusual instances in which it appears from the cir-
cumstances either that the parties assumed that one of them would not bear
the risk of a particular loss or that, although there was no such assumption, it
would be unjust to put the risk on that party. One such circumstance is an
extreme disproportion between the loss and the price charged by the party
whose liability for that loss is in question. The fact that the price is relatively
small suggests that it was not intended to cover the risk of such liability. An-
other such circumstance is an informality of dealing, including the absence of
a detailed written contract, which indicates that there was no careful attempt
to allocate all of the risks. The fact that the parties did not attempt to deline-
ate with precision all of the risks justifies a court in attempting to allocate
them fairly. The limitations dealt with in this Section are more likely to be
imposed in connection with contracts that do not arise in a commercial set-
ting. Typical examples of limitations imposed on damages under this discre-
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taken literally, it will apply to all liability for consequential losses-reli-
ance expenditures as well as lost profits. Moreover, even if a court's
objective is merely to reduce consequential liability to a more propor-
tional amount, that will often be difficult to do without limiting reliance
damages, because like any business transactions, the average conse-
quential transaction figures to be about eighty percent expenses. In
sum, despite its approving reference to reliance damages, section 351(3)
states a rule that could limit consequential reliance damages, both gen-
erally and especially as applied to those proved solely under the rule of
section 349.
The Restatement Second contains no direct recognition of the need to
limit section 349 reliance damages in particular. Two curious state-
ments in the commentary, however, indicate some underlying sensitivity
to the problem. First, the Comment to section 349, mentioned in the
previous section, states that the contract price is a ceiling on reliance
damages under section 349.69 Read literally, of course, the contract-
price limit would obliterate claims for consequential reliance losses. As-
suming that this was not meant, the existence of this puzzling statement
may reflect an intuitive recognition of the difficulty with consequential
reliance claims under the rule of section 349.
The idea of a contract price ceiling appears again in Comment d to
section 90, which says that "[i]n the case of a promise to make a gift it
would rarely be proper to award consequential damages which would
place a greater burden on the promisor than performance would have
imposed."'70 Given that section 90 damages must be proved with all the
certainty and foreseeability required for ordinary contract damages, this
statement must be read as an illustration of how the "as justice requires"
limitation might be applied to otherwise provable section 90 damages.
tionary power involve the denial of recovery for loss of profits and the
restriction of damages to loss incurred in reliance on the contract. Sometimes
these limits are covertly imposed, by means of an especially demanding re-
quirement of foreseeability or of certainty. The rule stated in this Section
recognizes that what is done in such cases is the imposition of a limitation in
the interests of justice.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351, Comment f (1979).
69 See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, Comment d (1979).
The drafting history of the Restatement Second contains a third instance in which the con-
tract price was offered as a ceiling on recovery for purposes that went beyond simple expec-
tancy theory. The problem involved the anomalous situation in restitution law in which, in
certain cases, a party who completes performance before breach can recover only the contract
price, whereas the party who performs only partly may sue in restitution for the value of
benefits conferred by the part performance, and in that case the contract price is not a ceiling.
The 1979 tentative draft proposed to limit restitution recovery in such cases to the sum that
would have been recoverable on full performance (i.e., the contract price). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 387(2) (Tent. Draft. No. 14, 1979). The proposal was, in effect,
withdrawn, see 56 ALI PROCEEDINGS 405-13 (1979), and the old rule left standing, see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(2) (1979).
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The suggestion seems to be that the gratuitous nature of the promise
should be considered as a factor relevant to the justice of imposing ex-
tended liability for consequential damages. Although this section 90
Comment clearly does not pertain to section 349 reliance damages gen-
erally, it does indicate a recognition that large consequential-reliance
claims are often less compelling than the more modest claims for direct
reliance.
Distinctions between various types of reliance claims tend to be ob-
scured by our preoccupation with the larger reliance-expectancy distinc-
tion, in which the point is usually to show that reliance claims are the
more compelling. We need to be reminded that important differences in
the degrees of ethical urgency exist within the category of reliance
claims as well. These differences are quite likely to influence decisions,
appearing in one form or another as a grudging attitude toward some
consequential-reliance claims.
CONCLUSION
One can well understand the reasons for wishing to give formal rec-
ognition to the reliance interest in the Restatement Second The substance
of the new Restatement owes an enormous intellectual debt to the analysis
underlying that concept. Far beyond its message about reliance, that
analysis has served a generation of contracts scholars as a model of how
to think about contract law generally. The Restatement Second without
the reliance interest would have been the words without the music.
Moreover, some tangible gain obviously accrues from according
formal approval to the ideas represented by the reliance interest con-
cept. At a minimum, such approval helps to clear away the wooden
conceptual structure of the first Restatement with which Fuller and Per-
due had to contend. The ideas themselves deserve to be commended as
the most useful starting point from which to seek understanding of the
reliance-based law that is, and to think about less settled issues such as
those opened by sections 158 and 272.
Because of its musical quality, however, the reliance interest con-
cept does not translate easily into the more formal and precise medium
of Restatement black letter. Fortunately, the concept is used only spar-
ingly, so that the problems it creates are not significant. Still, the
problems do illustrate the difficulties of giving more formal status to
concepts so general and multi-functional.
Restating the reliance interest has probably hardened some of the
less helpful conceptual overtones suggested by the expectation-reliance-
restitution matrix. This Article's quarrel with the overbroad entitle-
ment overtones of the reliance-interest definition is a small example.
More generally, the meaning of the interest matrix is likely to continue
to serve as a puzzling classroom problem for first-year law students, and
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writers will continue to feel obliged to explain how it fits with the losing-
contract problem. After all, it now says so in the Restatement Second
Use of the reliance interest as an operative measuring standard in-
volves more serious problems. As Fuller and Perdue defined it, the reli-
ance interest concept was made broad and loose enough to serve as an
analytical tool for a variety of problems. By making the reliance interest
serve the specific function of defining section 349 reliance damages, the
Restatement Second necessarily has begun to erect fences around that gen-
eral definition. The possible exclusion of foregone opportunities is one
example. The technical problems encountered by the difficulty of stat-
ing an expectancy-or causation ceiling are another. This is an inevitable
result when one uses a general concept to do black-letter work.
On the whole, the reliance-interest concept and its attendant Com-
ments do not furnish any sort of systematic definition of reliance dam-
ages. This is hardly surprising, for the notion of reliance damages as an
explicit remedy is relatively new, and contains many difficult issues of
application that appear unlikely to be resolved without considerable ex-
perience. The Restatement Second's expansion of explicit reliance remedies
will help bring more of these issues into the open. Meanwhile, it seems
fair to conclude that in this area, as in others, the role of the reliance-
interest concept in the Restatement Second is to invite development, not to
restate it.
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